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 1  God and morality 
 The first thing to note about the place of God, and ultimately Hell, in 
Kant’s account of morality, is that Kant rejects the idea that morality 
is in any way based upon, or derived from, God and His commands. 1 
The position that morality is based upon, or is derived from, God and 
His commands, is known as Divine Command Theory, or Theological 
Voluntarism. This is the view that, if there is no God then nothing is 
morally right or morally wrong – or morally optional; 2 on the other 
hand, if there is a God, and if God issues commands (e.g., “Thou shalt 
not lie”), then it is morally wrong to disobey those commands, morally 
right to obey them, and, it seems, morally optional to behave in ways 
that are not covered by those commands. 
 Kant rejects Divine Command Theory for the same reason that 
the characters of Socrates and Euthyphro reject it in Plato’s dialogue 
 Euthyphro (Plato, 2002). It is false that nothing is morally right, morally 
wrong, or morally optional independent of God’s commands. The proof 
of this is that, if God were to, for example, command people to perform 
some immoral action, such as to lie, then it would still be morally wrong 
to lie, despite God’s command to do so: “So nobody, not even the deity, 
is an originator of moral laws, since they have not arisen from choice, 
but are practically necessary; if they were not so, it might even be the 
case that lying was a virtue” ( L 27:283, p. 76). As Kant says in more detail 
in his lectures on ethics:
 For example, if I am not supposed to lie because God has forbidden it, 
but has done so because it pleased Him, then He could also have not 
forbidden it, had He so wished. But ... I must not lie, not because God 
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has forbidden it, but because it is bad in itself. ... [A]n action must be 
done, not because God wills it, but because it is righteous or good in 
itself; and it is because of this that God wills it and demands it of us. 
( L 27:262, p. 56) 3 
 Morality, as Kant says, is not created at all. Rather, morality is a set of 
necessary truths –  a priori truths – that are independent of God and 
that are discovered by reason (see R. G. Swinburne, 1976). As Kant says, 
“People have perceived their duties correctly, and recognized the odious-
ness of lying, without having any proper notion of God” ( L 27:277, 
p. 68). God does not create morality, “just as God is no originator of the 
fact that a triangle has three sides” (L 27:283, p. 76). In fact the “moral 
laws ... are ... just as necessary and eternal as God” ( L 27:331, p. 114). 
 Kant points out that it is quite obvious that Divine Command Theory 
is false. As he says: “God wills it – why should I” ( L 27:9, p. 5)? If I 
already know that God is moral, then I will do what God commands, 
but not because God commands it; I will do it because it is morally right. 
On the other hand, if I do not know that God is moral, then I will not 
do what God commands simply because God commands it: I will not 
do it because it might not be morally right. A divine command that 
something be done does not, by itself, make it morally right – no more 
than a federal law, or a parent’s command, or a Nazi officer’s order, ever, 
of themselves, make it morally right to obey. As Kant says: “Supposing 
the  arbitrium [will] of God to be known to me, where is the necessity 
that I should do it, if I have not already derived the obligation from the 
nature of the case?” (L 27:9, p. 5) To believe that a divine command to 
do something makes that thing morally right to do is, simply, to commit 
the fallacy of deriving a (moral) “ought” from an “is.” 4 One would first 
need at least some other moral ought, such as “One ought to obey God,” 
or “Whatever God commands is right,” to make God’s commands some-
thing morally right to do, and this moral ought (if it were a moral ought) 
would itself be completely independent of those commands. Morality, 
therefore, is independent of God. Indeed, according to Kant, the truths 
of morality apply to God as much as to His creations: “the human being 
(and with him every rational being) is an  end in itself , that is, can never 
be used merely as a means by anyone (not even by God)” ( CPR 5:131, 
p. 245). Hence, “even in God, morality must exist” ( L 27:10, p. 6). 
The reason why people hold that morality is somehow based upon, or 
derived from, God, as Kant explains, is that duties are often given in the 
form of a prohibition: “The cause of this derivation of morality from 
the divine will is as follows: Because moral laws run, Thou shalt not, it 
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is supposed that there must be a third being, who has forbidden it” ( L 
27:277, p. 68). 
 Nevertheless, it is true that there is an important relationship between 
morality and God: God is a moral being. Indeed, God is “the  only holy , 
the  only blessed , and the  only wise ” ( CPR 5:131, p. 245) being. Because 
God is a moral being who is “morally perfect (holy and beneficent)” ( CPR 
5:129, p. 245), everything that God commands is morally right. As he 
says: “the subjective morality of the divine are therefore coincident with 
objective morality” ( L 27:263, p. 56). Because God is omniscient as well 
as moral, God commands everything that is morally right: “God wills 
everything that is morally good and appropriate” ( L 27:1425, p. 68). All 
moral duties, therefore, are  also the commands of God. Indeed, Kant 
says that, properly understood, religion is “ the recognition of all duties as 
divine commands, not as sanctions ” ( CPR 5:130, p. 244), and “All morally 
good actions are thus, in their highest states, religious acts” ( L 27:17, 
p. 10). A moral individual who is a theist understands that, for example, 
even if it is a moral duty not to lie because lying is morally wrong, and 
not because God commands it, in addition to its being a moral duty not 
to lie, God commands us not to lie. This is true for every duty: “all moral 
laws ... are rules of divine will” ( L 27:263, p. 56). 
 2  God and punishment 
 To return to Kant’s argument against Divine Command Theory, it is 
possible to argue that, whether or not it is morally right to do what 
God commands because God commands it, it is nevertheless in one’s 
self-interest to do what God commands because God commands it. 
Otherwise, one will be punished. A divine command is not a  command , 
after all, unless it is backed up by a sanction. As the legal positivist John 
Austin (1861, p. 6) pointed out, “a command is distinguished from other 
significations of desire by this peculiarity: that the party to whom it is 
directed is liable to evil from the other, in case he comply not with the 
desire.” 
 Kant considers this objection by imagining a non-moral God who 
issues commands and punishes those who do not obey: “How dreadful, 
though, is a God without morality” ( L 27:10, p. 6). As terrifying as this 
prospect is, it would pose no conflict for the moral individual. Since 
morality is independent of a non-moral God, and since what the non-
moral God commanded would be morally wrong to do, one would only 
have a self-interested reason to obey the command of a non-moral God, 
whereas one would have an overriding moral reason to disobey the 
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command. The result is that “He will punish me; in that case it is inju-
rious” ( L 27:9, p. 5) but nothing more, and the moral individual would 
avoid moral wrongdoing. As Kant elsewhere says, “one who threatens 
me does not obligate, but extorts” ( L 27:1426, p. 69). Such a moral indi-
vidual would be like the Stoic in extreme pain who was proud because 
“he was aware that he had not incurred by it any wrongful action and 
thereby made himself deserving of punishment” ( CPR 5:60, p. 189). 5 
More importantly, what the non-moral God would do to the moral 
individual for refusing to obey the wrongful command would not, in 
fact,  be punishment. In such a case the “God displays merely ill-will” 
( L 27:10, p. 6). For a non-moral God to inflict harm upon a moral indi-
vidual for refusing to do what was morally wrong would simply be a 
morally wrongful act by the non-moral God – that is, the harming of 
an innocent person. As John Rawls (1955, p. 7) has pointed out, punish-
ment, according to retributivist philosophers like Kant, is reserved for 
the infliction of harm upon the  guilty : “no man can be punished unless 
he is guilty.” 6 Punishment, on Kant’s retributivist account, is the morally 
rightful infliction of harm upon those who have violated their moral 
duties, and thus who are guilty. A non-moral God, by its very nature, 
could never punish. 
 By contrast, God, who is a moral being, does engage in punishment. 
Indeed, God  must punish. All moral wrongdoing, according to Kant, is 
deserving of punishment, that is, the infliction of harm on the person 
who has committed the moral wrong:
 Finally there is in the idea of our practical reason something further 
that accompanies the transgression of a moral law, namely its 
 deserving punishment . Now, becoming a partaker in happiness cannot 
be combined with the concept of punishment as such. For, although 
he who punishes can at the same time have the kindly intention of 
directing the punishment to this end as well, yet it must first be justi-
fied in itself as punishment, that is, as mere harm, so that he who is 
punished, if it stopped there, and he could see no kindness hidden 
behind this harshness, must himself admit that justice was done 
to him and that what was allotted him was perfectly suited to his 
conduct. In every punishment as such there must first be justice, and 
this constitutes what is essential in this concept. ( CPR 5:27, p. 170) 
 To punish is an act of justice, and to  refrain from punishing – to refrain 
from inflicting harm on those who have transgressed their moral duties – 
is to  commit an act of injustice. God, in addition to being holy and 
Kant, Morality, and Hell 117
beneficent, is just: “We must therefore represent to ourselves a supreme 
being, who is holy in His laws, benevolent in his government, and just 
in His punishments and rewards. Now this in one being is the concept 
of God that is needed for religion, as the basis of natural religion” ( L 
27:306, p. 95). Indeed, Kant says about God that we “fear Him as a just 
judge” ( L 27:322, p. 107) and our “fear of God is directed simply to the 
righteousness of His justice” (L 27:322, p. 108). 
 As was established above, every moral duty is also something that 
God commands people to do. Given that God commands people to 
fulfill their moral duties, it follows that He must back up those divine 
commands with divine sanctions. Since God is omnipotent, it follows 
that He can punish anyone who transgresses any moral duty: that is, 
disobeys His commands. Since God is just, it follows that He must always 
punish all wrongdoers:
 The binding force of the law lies, therefore, in principle as it is 
known to reason; on the other hand, we can and must attach to this 
hypothesis the sense that God, as a moral and omnipotent being, 
is the supreme executor of all inner and outer moral laws, that He 
adds to their force the efficacy that is needed to manifest it, and that 
we, therefore, when we observe or transgress the laws, are subject to 
God’s judgment-seat, in that we have acted according to His will, or 
against it, and must expect the consequences. (L 27:530, p. 291) 
 God is thus the “supreme law-giver” (L 29:629, p. 246) for all morality – the 
executor of all morality: “You know the necessity of morality, and must also 
know that God is the supreme executor of its laws” (L 29:628, p. 245). 
 Here it is important to note the distinction between God’s beneficence 
and God’s justice. In God’s role as punisher of those who transgress 
morality, God must act justly, rather than beneficently. Beneficence 
consists of promoting the happiness of others who are  innocent of 
wrongdoing (only). Those who are guilty of wrongdoing are not candi-
dates for beneficence: they are candidates for punishment, which is a 
requirement of justice. As Kant is fond of pointing out, “indulgence and 
dispensation ... do not harmonize with justice” ( CPR 5:124, p. 103). In 
a lengthy passage in the lectures on ethics, Kant explains that because 
 morality , which is independent of God, requires that moral wrongdoers 
be punished, it follows that God must punish moral wrongdoers:
 Because men are exceedingly frail in all acts of morality, and not only 
what they practice as a good action is very defective and flawed, but 
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they also consciously and willfully violate the divine law, they are 
quite unable to confront a holy and just judge, who cannot forgive 
evil-doing  simpliciter . The question is, can we, by our vehement 
begging and beseeching, hope for and obtain through God’s good-
ness the forgiveness of all of our sins? No, we cannot without contra-
diction conceive of a kindly judge; as ruler he may well be kindly; 
but a judge must be just. For if God could forgive all evil-doing, He 
could also make it permissible and if He can grant it impunity, it 
rests also on His will to make it permitted; in that case, however, 
the moral laws would be an arbitrary matter, though in fact they are 
not arbitrary, but just as necessary and eternal as God. God’s justice 
is the precise allocation of punishments and rewards in accordance 
with men’s good or bad behavior. The divine will is immutable. ... So 
begging can bring about no remission of punishment; the holy law 
necessarily entails that punishments should be appropriate to actions. 
( L 27:331, p. 114) 
 Here it is worth making explicit the form that God’s punishment of 
moral wrongdoers takes. It is to send wrongdoers to Hell, where 
“[H]ell [is] ... a state containing nothing but evil and involving a total 
loss of consolation and the utmost pain” ( L 27: 691, p. 420). 
 God’s role in Kant’s account of morality, therefore, is not to create 
morality, or to ground morality, or to serve as the basis of morality, since 
morality is independent of Him, and even applies to Him. God’s role is 
to  enforce morality, in the sense of punishing those who transgress their 
moral duties, by sending them to Hell, and rewarding those who abide 
by morality, by sending them to Heaven. Kant says that “God must 
necessarily reward men whose behavior is in accordance with the moral 
law” ( L 27:268, p. 60), but it is equally true that He must necessarily 
punish those whose behavior is not in accordance with the moral law. 
Without the availability of Hell, God could not punish moral wrong-
doers, and hence would not be just. 
 In order for God to punish moral wrongdoers (and reward moral 
rightdoers), it is necessary that God be omniscient, for a very partic-
ular reason. Morality does not merely require that one perform certain 
actions and omissions. It requires that one perform those actions and 
omissions because it is one’s moral duty to do so – that one have a “good 
will” (G 4:393, p. 49) and act from the motive of duty, which is the only 
moral motive. Only God, however, is able to know the motives behind 
people’s actions and omissions, and whether or not they are acting from 
the motive of duty. In addition to acting contrary to duty (“consciously 
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and wilfully violate the divine law”), it is possible for people to act in 
accordance with duty from motives that are other than the motive of 
duty (“what they practice as a good action is very defective and flawed”). 
As Kant is fond of saying: “God desires, not the action, but the heart” ( L : 
27: 274, p. 65). 7 One fails to be moral – one’s actions fail to have moral 
worth – if one abides by one’s moral duties from a motive that is not the 
moral motive. 
 Kant provides two examples of such failures in the  Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals . One involves a merchant who abides by the moral 
duty to treat all of his customers equally and charge everyone the same 
price, but who does so from the motive of self-interest, and not from the 
motive of duty:
 For example, it certainly conforms with duty that a shopkeeper not 
overcharge an inexperienced customer, and where there is a good 
deal of trade a prudent merchant does not overcharge but keeps a 
fixed general price for everyone, so that a child can buy from him as 
well as everyone else. People are thus served  honestly ; but this is not 
nearly enough for us to believe that the merchant acted in this way 
from duty and basic principles of honesty; his advantage required it; 
it cannot be assumed here that he had, besides, an immediate inclina-
tion toward his customers, so as from love, as it were, to give no one 
preference over another in the matter of price. Thus the action was 
done neither from duty nor from immediate inclination, but merely 
for purposes of self-interest. ( G 4: 398, p. 53) 
 The second involves a person who is beneficent, which is a moral duty, 
but who acts out of a direct inclination to help others, and not from the 
motive of duty:
 To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and besides there are many 
souls so sympathetically attuned that, without any other motive of 
vanity or self-interest they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy 
around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far 
as it is their own work. But I assert that in such a case an action of this 
kind, however it may conform with duty and however amiable it may 
be, has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing 
with other inclinations. ( G , 4: 398, p. 53) 
 Both of these individuals fail to be moral, although they abide by their 
moral duties. It follows that, unlike in the case of a human law, where one 
120 James Edwin Mahon
meets one’s legal obligation simply by performing the (outward) action 
or omission – as it has been said, “hardly any rule of penal law is more 
definitely settled than that motive is irrelevant” (Hall, 1947, pp. 153–4) 
(it does not matter  why you did not commit murder, only that you did 
 not commit murder; and it does not matter  why you committed murder, 
only that it  was murder) 8 – in the case of morality, one fails to meet one’s 
moral obligation simply by performing the (outward) action or omis-
sion from a non-moral motive. One must also perform the action or 
omission from a moral motive – the motive of duty. What this entails is 
that one may be punished by God – or at the very least, one may fail to 
be rewarded by God – if one abides by one’s moral duties, that is, obeys 
God’s commands, from a non-moral motive. 
 For example, the moral law tells us to promote the happiness of all 
men, and God wills this also; if I now act in accordance with the 
divine will, and practice well-doing to obtain rewards from God 
thereafter, I have not done the action from any moral disposition, 
but by reference to the divine will, in order to be rewarded later on. 
Insofar as a man may have fulfilled the divine law in a pragmatic 
sense, he has at least satisfied the law, and may to that extent expect 
good consequences, in that he has, after all, done what God wanted, 
even though the disposition was impure. But God wills the disposi-
tion; morality is what conforms to His will, and as laws of that kind 
they oblige absolutely ... We have therefore to regard God, not as a 
pragmatic lawgiver, but as a moral one. ( L 27: 283, pp. 76–7) 
 God’s role, therefore, is that of a moral judge, to punish moral wrong-
doers (and reward moral rightdoers) for failing to live up to morality. In 
order to avoid punishment by being sent to Hell, and earn the reward 
of being sent to Heaven, it is necessary “to please God by inner disposi-
tions, and to practice His holy law, and to hope by His benevolence for 
a supplement to our frailties” ( L 27: 334, p. 117). Having the right inner 
disposition is necessary to be moral in the case of divine justice. 
 3  Belief in God 
 Given the important role that God plays in Kant’s account of morality, it 
may seem peculiar that Kant holds that it is impossible to know whether 
or not God exists, or whether or not the soul is immortal, or whether or 
not Hell and Heaven exist. As it turns out, however, the impossibility of 
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knowing any of these things might actually help people to achieve the 
end of avoiding Hell and making it to Heaven. 
 Kant is rightly famous for undermining all of the celebrated “proofs” 
for God’s existence. In a single section of his  Critique of Practical Reason , 
for example, he runs through each of the three most famous “proofs” 
for God’s existence – the Cosmological Argument, the Ontological 
Argument, and the Teleological Argument, or Argument from Design – 
and points out their flaws. 
 In the case of the Cosmological Argument, which holds that one can 
deduce the existence of God from the existence of the universe, Kant 
argues that, given our understanding of God as a being endowed with all 
perfections, in order to deduce the existence of a perfect being from the 
existence of the universe, it would be necessary to know that the world 
or universe is perfect. This, however, is impossible for us to know:
 But it is impossible through metaphysics to proceed by  sure inferences 
from knowledge of this world to the concept of God and to the proof 
of his existence, for this reason: that I order to say that this world 
was possible only through a  God (as we must think this concept) we 
would have to cognize this world as the most perfect whole possible 
and, in order to do so, cognize all possible worlds as well (so as to be 
able to compare them with this one), and would therefore have to be 
omniscient. ( CPR 5: 138–139, p. 251) 
 In the case of the Ontological Argument, which holds that one can 
deduce the existence of God from the concept of God as a being with all 
perfections – since existence is a perfection, and thus God has the perfec-
tion of existing – Kant argues that all the argument demonstrates is that 
existence, like omniscience or omnipotence, belongs to the concept of 
God. It still remains to be determined if there is anything that exists that 
corresponds to this concept:
 [I]t is absolutely impossible to cognize the existence of this being from 
mere concepts, because every existential proposition – that is, every 
proposition that says, of a being of which I frame a concept, that it 
exists – is a synthetic proposition, that is, one by which I go beyond 
that concept and say more about it than was thought in the concept, 
namely, that to this concept  in the understanding there corresponds an 
object  outside the understanding , which it is absolutely impossible to 
elicit by any inference. ( CPR 5: 138–139, p. 251) 
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 Finally, in the case of the Teleological Argument, or Argument from 
Design, which holds that God’s existence can be deduced from the 
order that we find in the universe, Kant argues that the most that can 
be inferred from the order of the universe is a being that is intelligent, 
powerful, and good. This, however, falls short of God, who is not merely 
that, but omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-beneficent:
 Since we can know only a small part of this world and can still less 
compare it with all possible worlds, we can well infer from its order, 
purposiveness, and magnitude a  wise, beneficent, powerful , and so 
forth author of it, but not his  omniscience,  all-beneficence, omnipotence , 
and so forth. ( CPR 5:140; 252) 9 
 In place of all these arguments for God’s existence Kant provides a radi-
cally different argument, one that has sometimes been referred to as the 
Moral Argument for the existence of God, although it should not be 
thought of as an attempt at a “proof.” 
 Kant argues that God, personal immortality, and with them, Hell 
and Heaven, are possible, and that there is no disproof of any of 
them (they are not self-contradictory, and they are not disproven by 
science, since they are outside the purview of science; see Sullivan, 
1989, p. 224). He also argues that we know it to be true that we  have 
moral duties, and that we know it to be true that our moral duties 
are categorical – that is, that they  must be fulfilled,  without exception. 
He also argues that we know that there is no guarantee that abiding 
by such moral duties will bring us happiness, since being happy is 
distinct from being moral, and we also know that those who do not 
abide by their duties can be happy. The certainty of our moral duties, 
combined with the certainty that fulfilling them does not necessarily 
lead to our own happiness, leads us to conclude that there is a future 
state in which, of necessity, those who do not abide by their moral 
duties are punished (Hell), and those who abide by them are rewarded 
(Heaven). The  only way in which such a just outcome can be  certain 
is if God exists, we are immortal, and Hell and Heaven exist. Hence, 
we believe that “God will, in total, at the end of it all, make every-
thing good” ( L 27: 28, p. 14). That is, God will punish the wicked, 
and reward the virtuous, in a way that is perfectly proportionate to 
their vice and virtue. Our belief in morality leads us to believe this. 
It is, however, less than proof: “We know God, not by intuition, but 
through faith” ( L 27: 338, p. 120). 
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 It is important to note here that the fact that the Moral Argument for 
the existence of God is less than a proof – the fact that there is no proof 
for the existence of God – might actually help people to avoid Hell. If the 
existence of God, immortality, and Hell and Heaven, were provable – in 
particular, if being sent to Hell were a certainty if we transgressed our 
moral duties, and being sent to Heaven were a certainty if we abided 
by our moral duties – then this might have the effect of undermining 
our moral motivation. In such a situation, we would have an extremely 
strong non-moral motivation not to transgress our moral duties (and 
disobey God’s commands) – namely, the self-interested motive of 
avoiding Hell – and an extremely strong non-moral motivation to abide 
by our moral duties (and obey God’s commands) – namely, the self-
interested motive of getting to Heaven. This self-interested motivation 
to avoid transgressing our moral duties and to abide by them (to avoid 
disobeying God’s commands and to obey them) might compete with 
the moral motivation to avoid transgressing our moral duties and to 
abide by them from the motive of duty: that is, to do so because it is the 
morally right thing to do, irrespective of divine reward and punishment. 
However, in order to avoid divine punishment, or at least in order to 
receive divine reward, it is not enough to avoid transgressing our moral 
duties and to abide by them (to avoid disobeying God’s commands and 
to obey them). One must also do so from the motive of duty. This is 
what it means to be moral. Since it might be more difficult to abide by 
our moral duties from the motive of duty if we had a competing self-in-
terested motivation to do so, it follows that it might be more difficult for 
us to be moral if the existence of God, immortality, and Hell and Heaven 
were certain. Although it seems paradoxical to say so, it might be more 
difficult to avoid Hell, if the existence of Hell (and God, immortality, 
and Heaven) were certain. Or at least, it might be more difficult to get to 
Heaven. 10 This may be a further reason why, as Kant (1998, p. 117) said, 
he “had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.” 
 As the situation stands, the existence of God, immortality, and Hell 
and Heaven are not certain. Nevertheless, we do not have mere uncer-
tainty. We have a belief in their existence. Such a belief gives us the hope 
that “God will, in total, at the end of it all, make everything good.” 
What we must do is be  worthy of divine reward, by abiding by our moral 
duties, from the motive of duty: “If only we cultivate good dispositions, 
and bend all our efforts to fulfillment of the moral law, we may hope 
that God will have the means to remedy this imperfection” (L 27:318, 
p. 104). This should be enough to keep us out of Hell. 
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 Notes 
 1 .  In citing Kant’s works the following abbreviations are used: 
 —— G: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ( Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik 
 der  Sitten ) [1785], translated by Mary J. Gregor, in  Practical Philosophy , edited 
and translated by Mary J. Gregor and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37–108. 
 ——  CPR :  Critique of Practical Reason ( Critik  der  Practischen  Vernunft ) [1788], 
translated by Mary J. Gregor, in  Practical Philosophy , 137–271. 
 —— MM :  The Metaphysics of Morals ( Die  Metaphysik  der  Sitten ), comprising 
the  Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right ( Metaphysische 
 Anfangsgünde  der  Rechtslehre ) [1797] and the  Metaphysical First Principles of 
the Doctrine of Virtue ( Metaphysische  Anfangsgünde  der  Tugendlehre ) [1797], 
translated by Mary J. Gregor, in  Practical Philosophy , 353–603. 
 —— L :  Lectures on ethics ( Vorlesungen  über  Ethik ) [1924] translated by Peter 
Heath and edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 —— RE: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, translated by George di 
Giovanni, in  Religion and Rational Theology , edited and translated by Allen 
W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 24–37. 
 Pagination references in the text and footnotes are as follows: first, to the 
volume and page number in the German edition of Kant’s works,  Kants 
 gesammelte  Schriften , edited by the Königlich Preußischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, subsequently Deutsche, now Berlin-Brandenburg Akademie 
der Wissenschaften (originally under the editorship of Wilhelm Dilthey) 
(Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, 1900 – ); secondly, to 
the translations. All emphases in the original unless otherwise indicated. 
 2 .  The claim that “If there is no God, then everything is permitted,” which has often 
been attributed to a character in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s  The Brothers Karamazov, 
is, as a summary of Divine Command Theory, self-contradictory. If morality is 
entirely dependent upon God, and if there is no God, then there is no morality; 
if there is no morality, then  nothing is (morally) permitted (or prohibited, or 
required). Morality must exist for anything to be (morally)  permissible to do, 
even if the narrower meaning of “permissible” (i.e., optional), as opposed to the 
broader meaning of “permissible” (i.e., either optional or required), is intended. 
If there is no morality, then nothing is morally okay, or morally right, morally 
wrong, because all of those categories are moral categories. See S. Darwall (1998, 
p. 42). I am indebted to Darwall’s discussion of Theological Voluntarism. 
 3 .  See also: “suicide is not abominable because God has forbidden it; on the 
contrary, God has forbidden it because it is abominable ... So the reason 
for regarding suicide and other transgressions of duty as abominable must 
be derived, not from the divine will, but from their inherently abominable 
nature” ( L 27:342–343, p. 124; cf.  L 27:375, p. 149). 
 4 .  G. E. Moore (1993, p. 179) argued that “the assertion ‘This is good’ is  not iden-
tical with the assertion ‘This is willed,’ either by a supersensible will, or other-
wise.” To believe so, was to commit the “naturalistic fallacy” (1993, p. 62) of 
identifying morality with something non-moral. 
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 5 .  One might say here, with Socrates, that “a good man cannot be harmed 
either in life or in death,” in the sense that a “good man’s” goodness – his 
good character or moral being – cannot be affected by the immoral acts of 
others, and that the most that can happen to a “good man” is that he physi-
cally harmed or killed (Plato, 2002, p. 44). 
 6 .  Even consequentialists, who would justify “accepting the infliction of 
suffering on innocent persons if it is for the good of society (whether or not 
one calls this punishment)” (Rawls, 1955, p. 9), and who would perhaps call 
this “punishment,” would perhaps be reluctant to call the infliction of harm 
on an innocent person who refused to obey a command of non-moral God a 
“punishment.” 
 7 .  See also “God looks to the humbled heart and not to the humbled body” 
(L 27:339, p. 120). 
 8 .  Motive must be irrelevant to the judgment of innocence or guilt under 
the law, since it is not possible, on Kant’s account, to determine a person’s 
motives. It is enough to determine a person’s intentions (the  mens  rea ), 
regardless of the motive behind the intention. 
 9 .  See also the more extensive criticisms of these three celebrated “proofs” 
(Kant, 1998). 
 10 .  Lara Denis (2003, p. 204 n 12) has said that “Because we do not  know that 
God exists, Kant thinks that our interest in pleasing God through our good 
conduct need not undermine pure moral motivation.” The implication here, 
I take it, is that, if we  did know that God exists, then this  would undermine 
our pure moral motivation to do our duty, since we would have an  even 
stronger interest in pleasing God through our good conduct. But the effect of 
undermining our pure moral motivation would be to make us less eligible for 
divine reward. 
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